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Abstract: This paper consists of an introductory survey of two fundamental questions 
regarding the link between entrepreneurship and economic growth. The first one deals 
with the endogenous relationship between entrepreneurship and growth. In particular, 
we suggest that, while more entrepreneurship could mean more economic growth, 
economic growth in turn could affect the individual arbitrage between different 
professional occupations (including entrepreneurship) and expected payoffs. The second 
question is concerned with the types of activities to which the individual directs his 
talents. We distinguish between entrepreneurship and rent-seeking. The impact on 
economic growth is assessed in static and dynamic frameworks.  
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Introduction 
 
The idea that entrepreneurship and economic growth are very closely and positively 
linked together has undoubtedly made its way since the early works of Schumpeter 
(1911)1. An increase in the number of entrepreneurs leads to an increase in economic 
growth. This effect is a result of the concrete expression of their skills, and more 
precisely, their propensity to innovate. Schumpeter has already described this 
innovative activity, “the carrying out of new combinations”, by distinguishing five 
cases2: “(1) The introduction of a new good – that is one with which consumers are not 
yet familiar – or of a new quality of a good. (2) The introduction of a new method of 
production, that is one not yet tested by experience in the branch of manufacture 
concerned, which need by no means be founded upon a discovery scientifically new, 
and can also exist in a new way of handling a commodity commercially. (3) The opening 
of a new market, that is a market into which the particular branch of manufacture of the 
country in question has not previously entered, whether or not this market has existed 
before. (4) The conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials or half-
manufactured goods, again irrespective of whether this source already exists or whether 
it has first to be created. (5) The carrying out of the new organisation of any industry, 
like the creation of a monopoly position (for example through trustification) or the 
breaking up of a monopoly position” (Schumpeter, 1963 (1911), p. 66). Through his 
innovative activity, the Schumpeterian entrepreneur seeks to create new profit 
opportunities. These opportunities can result from productivity increases, in which case, 
their relationship to economic growth appears quite clearly. Moreover, the 
disequilibrium created by the entrepreneur can be propitious for additional innovations 
and profit opportunities. Therefore, more entrepreneurs means more growth, which in 
turn leads to more entrepreneurs… The phenomena seem to be self-feeding. 
 
Although in some way relatively limited in regards to the interaction between 
entrepreneurship and economic growth, economic theory is not without enlightening 
arguments on the subject. We will use some of these arguments in our examination of 
two fundamental questions, which have already received some treatment in the 
economic literature. 
 
The first of these questions is the assessment, by means of a non-formalised discussion, 
of the interdependent nature of entrepreneurship and growth. This assessment will 
permit us to set certain limits on this relationship. We will grant special attention to 
particular concepts, as well as to the description of entrepreneurial supply, by referring 
to individual decisions to undertake economic activities. These decisions can appear as 
the result of an arbitrage between different professional occupations (to be self-
employed or to be an employee), based on relative expected rewards according to the 
specific abilities of the agent. We will then suggest the endogenous relationship between 
                                                 
1 Relatively to these issues, the Aghion and Howitt’s book (1998) must certainly be distinguished 
amongst the recently published contributions. 
2 “The carrying out of new combinations” defines what Schumpeter means by “economic 
development” (Schumpeter, 1963 (1911), p. 66), that is more than “economic growth”.   3
entrepreneurship and growth and how labour market reactions operate to create some 
boundaries on their symbiotic interactions. 
 
The second question that is examined is in fact threefold. It deals with the types of 
activities to which the entrepreneur directs his talents (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1991). These activities will be distinguished according to the social productivity of their 
character (Baumol, 1990). We will introduce, at this time, rent-seeking behaviour, followed 
by an examination of factors explaining the allocation of entrepreneurial skill. Finally, 
respective to this allocation, we will see that an assessment of its impact in terms of 
economic growth must be appreciated not only in a static framework – the importance 
of positive effects for the society as a whole depends upon the proportion of productive 
projects –, but must also take into account the interactions between entrepreneurship 
and rent-seeking behaviour. 
 
 
1  Occupational arbitrage and economic growth 
 
This section is articulated as follows: first, we will reappraise, from the introduction, the 
relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth by going a step further 
into conceptualisation. We will point out skills that are generally associated with the 
entrepreneur. The individual arbitrage between different professional occupations will 
then be sketched. An entrepreneurial supply will be defined. Finally, taking into account 
the aggregated impact of individual choices on expected pay-offs, will allow us to 
underscore the endogeneity of growth and entrepreneurial decisions. 
 
Innovative entrepreneurship and economic growth 
 
Among the possible sources of economic growth and development, innovation has 
received a special treatment in the economic literature because it has been more or less 
linked with the figure of the individual entrepreneur. Relatively to this question, the 
early Schumpeter (1911) appears to be particularly original and pervasive. 
 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century however, the way in which economic 
theory brings together economic and innovative processes through entrepreneurship, 
must certainly be revised. In fact, this has been in that economic analysis has 
undoubtedly reduced the “noise” between the articulation of simple concepts and recent 
observations.  
 
Schumpeter (1942) himself predicted that, due to irresistible trend of concentration in the 
capitalist system, innovation could no longer be the realm of the entrepreneur, but 
would in fact primarily be the job of innovation professionals and laboratories 
controlled by big companies, themselves being directed by managers.  
 
If indeed there still remains a place for innovative entrepreneurship, embodied by the 
action of individuals, it can no longer be seen as the sole vector of innovation.   
   4
In a recent and comprehensive survey of the literature, Wennekers and Thurik (1999) 
emphasise the decomposition of the concept of entrepreneurship in order to gain a 
better understanding of the links between entrepreneurship and economic growth. 
Although their “pragmatic distinctions” are formulated, through a long and detailed 
discussion, for operational and not theoretical purposes, they remain helpful in grasping 
the question at hand. 
 
 
Table I: Three types of entrepreneurs 
 
   
 Self-employed  Employee 
   
   
Entrepreneurial  Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs  
Intrapreneurs 
   
Managerial  Managerial business 
owners  
Executive managers 
   
 
Source: Wennekers et Thurik (1999, p. 47). 
 
 
Associating, on the one hand, entrepreneurial with “the manifest ability and willingness 
of individuals, on their own, in teams, within and outside existing organisations, to 
perceive and create new economic opportunities (new products, new production 
methods, new organisational schemes and new product–market combinations) and to 
introduce their ideas in the market, in the face of uncertainty and other obstacles, by 
making decisions on location, form and the use of resources and institutions”, and, on 
the other hand, managerial with “organising and coordinating”,  Wennekers and Thurik 
(1999, p. 46–48) cross these definitions with the distinction between self–employed and 
employee. 
 
Thus, the authors are able to define four different types of situations. Three of these are 
types of entrepreneurs: Schumpeterian entrepreneurs (entrepreneurial and self–
employed), intrapreneurs (entrepreneurial and employee) and managerial business 
owners (managerial and self–employed) 3.  
 
Both Schumpeterian entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs contribute actively to feed a 
creative destruction process (Schumpeter, 1942). Although managerial business owners 
play an important role in the economy for the achievement of production and trade, and 
can even reveal themselves as entrepreneurial and develop innovative projects, their 
                                                 
3 The fourth type corresponds to the executive managers (managerial and employee). 
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activities are more closely tied to routine work. So, “(t)hey include many franchisees, 
shopkeepers and people in professional occupations” (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999, p. 
48), and generally represent the great majority of the self–employed. 
 
By introducing new ideas, new processes, new products and services, Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs affect and ultimately renew the economic activities: the 
activities not only of the firms and industries, but also those of the region in which they 
are situated. When these entrepreneurial initiatives are aggregated and evaluated in 
terms of economic impacts at a territorial level, it could mean economic growth.  
 
This process tends to be a diverse one. “At the aggregate level of industries, regions and 
national economies, the many individual entrepreneurial actions compose a mosaic of 
new experiments. In evolutionary terms this can be called variety. A process of 
competition between these various ideas and initiatives takes place continuously, 
leading to the selection of the most viable firms and industries. Variety, competition, 
selection and also imitation (...) expand and transform the productive potential of a 
regional or national economy (by replacement or displacement of obsolete firms, by 
higher productivity and by expansion of new niches and industries)” (Wennekers and 
Thurik, 1999, p. 50). 
 
Greater productivity, as well as firm exits, allow for the possibility of resource 
reallocation into new combinations. When particular to a given territory, this greater 
productivity could mean an increase in competitive advantages and localised economic 
growth. However, this process should be globally followed by a positive net effect. In 
other words, the competition case that we describe is not a zero-sum game. 
 
From entrepreneurial initiatives to economic growth, a number of conditions and 
multiple effects, at different levels, ultimately determine the impact of one phenomenon 
in regards to another. However, a working assumption will be: the larger the share of 
innovative entrepreneurs in the workforce, the more elevated the rhythm of economic 
growth. 
 
Toward the definition of an entrepreneurial supply 
 
A simple approach in determining the share of innovative entrepreneurs in the active 
population is to begin by considering each individual as a potential entrepreneur, 
characterised by the specific capacity to become one. That is, we recognise the 
heterogeneity of the population. These individuals are then confronted with 
heterogeneous career opportunities (different projects) with different expected pay-offs. 
The individual choice is finally an arbitrage between pairs of project and pay-offs, for 
given skill sets. These projects include the choice of a career as an employee. 
 
What then, briefly, are the individual characteristics that determine the entrepreneurial 
potentialities?  
 
Knight (1921) introduces a distinction between risk and uncertainty.  Risk enters into 
computations with known probabilities. On the contrary, uncertainty although it takes   6
into account the notion of risk, refers also to non-foreseeable events. In other words, 
events whose probabilities are at this time unknown. Estimating the degree, to which a 
particular event is weighted with uncertainty, depends upon individual judgement 
expressed in terms of subjective probabilities4. This understood, an entrepreneurial 
candidate is the one who, taking into account his judgement, would accept to bear the 
uncertainty of production and trade5. Expected profits would be payment for this 
specific activity. 
 
We note, by the way, that, within a Schumpeterian framework, what characterises an 
entrepreneur is not a particular ability to bear the consequences of unforeseeable events. 
The capitalist plays this role. Undertaking economic activities and innovating require 
skills that make the entrepreneur a person of exception. One of his motives continues to 
be profit-seeking. 
 
Lucas (1978), Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991), Jovanovic (1994, presenting a 
generalisation of Lucas model) come closer to a Schumpeterian concept of 
entrepreneurship in the sense that, in their models, individuals are not different in their 
attitude towards risk, but in their competence, intelligence, creative capacities...6 It is in 
fact possible to see in the enumeration, a wide range of skills that are corresponding to 
“talents”, valuable traits in an entrepreneurial project (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1991). 
 
A synthesis of the different approaches runs through the tight definition of an 
entrepreneur offer curve (Burke, 1995; quoting Schultz (1975) and Casson (1982)). This offer 
sums up, amongst other arguments, the previously evoked traits of the working 
population. It meets an entrepreneurial demand that represents a variety of profit 
opportunities. 
 
What can be considered as the advantageous aspects of the offer-demand synthesis, at 
the same time comprises some of its weaknesses. The general framework on which it is 
based, can disguise heterogeneous situations that each previous model translates, 
although only in part. We must recognise that what is following an individual arbitrage 
is in fact rather coming out of a black box. 
 
                                                 
4 Distinguishing between known and unknown probabilities is a matter of debate. Thus, do the 
so-called known probabilities not rest on judgment and subjective methods? Baron and Frisch 
(1994, pp. 289-290) are more specific about this distinction and introduce the discussion that we 
refer to. 
5 Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) propose a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. Individuals 
differ by their risk aversion.  They choose between being an employee, for an unrisky wage, and 
being an entrepreneur, for a risky profit. Real wage is the equilibrating variable. Cf. also Kanbur 
(1979). 
6 In the models cited, agents which are the best endowed with qualities that can be called up in 
entrepreneurial projects control the biggest firms. So, herein exists some explicative argument for 
the distribution of firm sizes. For a brief synthesis on the question, cf. Audretsch (1994). 
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More entrepreneurs, more growth, more entrepreneurs? 
 
Interpreting the above arguments, we can consider an individual’s career as a chain of 
individual arbitrages between pairs of project and pay-offs given individual abilities. 
Aggregating individual situations at a given time t, reveals the share of entrepreneurs in 
the working population. However, for the purposes of assessing more carefully the links 
between entrepreneurship and economic growth, this is not a sufficient result. Time 
must be reintroduced as a period, allowing in that case interactions between each term 
 
By fostering economic growth, entrepreneurship affects the whole economy. Particularly 
hard to ignore are its effects on labour markets. More growth might, on one hand, 
signify an increase in profit opportunities for potential entrepreneurs. On the other 
hand, it could lead to inflationary pressures on wages7. It must be noted that raises in 
wage cannot necessarily be derived as the result of disequilibrium on the labour 
markets. In fact, raises in wage may indeed be the consequence of the application of 
profit-sharing schemes within the firms8. From the above considerations, it follows that 
growth in turn can seriously affect the individual arbitrage that we have discussed. So, 
appears the problem of endogeneity by way of markets and pay-offs adjustments. 
 
 
2  Entrepreneurship versus rent-seeking 
 
Different rhythms of growth between nations, that have been theoretically associated 
with entrepreneurship9, are not fully explained by different entrepreneurial supply, 
measured in quantitative terms. The allocation of this supply between more and less 
socially productive projects must also be taken into account. This question introduces 
the idea of rent-seeking behaviour. Its examination will be the subject of the following 
section. 
 
After having briefly defined the general framework and the employed concepts, we will 
discuss the allocation of entrepreneurs between different types of economic projects (in 
other words between innovative entrepreneurship and rent-seeking), as well as the 
explicative factors of this allocation. A dynamic set-up will follow, where we will 
examine interactions between project categories and their relations to growth. 
 
 
                                                 
7 The argument presented is undoubtedly exceedingly simplified. Thus, the analysis should be 
continued, particularly by examining the impacts of increased productivity and competitiveness 
on labour demand. 
8 In this case, an interesting and important question in regards to the feeding of economic growth 
is to know if this scheme favours intrapreneurs or introduces no distinction between staff 
members. 
9 Surely, we can stress here the limits of this paper in that it considers only the sources of 
economic growth related to entrepreneurship. There are numerous variables, besides population 
growth, which can explain economic growth. It is however easily conceivable that 
entrepreneurship, through the innovation that it carries out, greatly contributes to their 
application.   8
Definitions 
 
To this point, the individual arbitrage between different remunerative occupations 
ended up, in all cases, in the development of socially productive activities. Therefore, the 
described economy has been a strict income economy. Individuals were exploiting, as 
best they could, their skills entrepreneurial or otherwise and given the exercised 
occupations, private interests and social benefits were successfully coinciding. 
 
In the following, we will introduce another type of activity, which is remunerated by 
transfers. We may note that, by definition, transfers do not imply a productive 
counterpart. This assumption will result in the possibility that a distortion between 
private and collective interests may occur. This distortion becomes undoubtedly 
effective when rent-seeking is involved10. 
 
The rent-seeking (behaviour) refers to “the socially costly pursuit of wealth transfers” 
(Tollison, 1997, p. 506). In other words, rent-seeking is manifested when the bottom-line 
of its social consequences is negative. The fact that this definition allows for an 
expression of the social opportunity cost that represents a diversion of resources 
towards (or following) this type of activity should be emphasised. Examples of rent-
seeking are: corruption, stealing, bribery, as well as seeking abusive judicial 
compensation or protection-seeking with the express purpose of limiting economic 
competition and promoting particular interest… Rent-seeking can originate both from 
the public or private sector. 
 
In regards to the connection between entrepreneurship and growth, the occurrence of 
unproductive but yet remunerated activities means not only that projects with socially 
positive or negative impacts are in competition, but also that there is a direct potential 
diversion of entrepreneurial talents. For this diversion to take place, we need indeed to 
assume that the skills and abilities required by entrepreneurship and by rent-seeking 
correspond. 
 
Following these considerations, at least two remarks can be formulated. The first one 
refers to public services. These are generally financed by transfers, but are not included 
in rent-seeking, given their productive contribution. We note furthermore that 
discussing the redistribution role of the state is outside the framework of this paper. This 
is different, however, as soon as we look at legal institutions that organise productive 
activities, as they might, by limiting competition for example, create rent-seeking 
situations. 
 
The second remark concerns the entrepreneurial initiatives. Through innovation, the 
entrepreneur seeks to create a monopoly position, from which he will assume overprofit. 
In the Schumpeterian model, this position is necessary fore it motivates the innovation 
activity. It is however temporary, as competition will quickly reduce this position to zero 
in favour of a new monopoly position created by a new innovation… The institutional 
                                                 
10 According to Tollison (1997), rent-seeking has been introduced in economic theory by Tullock 
(1967). For diverse applications of the concept, cf. Congleton and Tollison (1995).   9
framework, that of competition, is then of primary importance. In this case, a dynamic 
assessment of events will justify the existence of an abnormal profit, as it will distinguish 
its positive net contribution to the social benefit11. 
 
Rent-seeking behaviour thus being defined, as well as the general framework of this 
section, we will address in the remaining discussion the allocation of talents and its links 
to growth. 
 
Explaining the allocation of talents 
 
The allocation of talents between socially productive and unproductive projects and its 
impact on economic growth have already been subject to theoretical studies12. The static 
results of these studies scarcely elicit further commentary, when we take into account 
the preceding arguments. Indeed it appears quite easily that the diversion of 
entrepreneurial talents towards unproductive activities will have a negative impact on 
growth rate. However, the explicative factors of the allocation deserve greater 
consideration. 
 
Attempting to explain the allocation of talents implies both reconsidering the arguments 
that have been exposed with regard to the individual arbitrage between remunerative 
activities and considering the non-pecuniary factors that may also have some impact. 
 
According to Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991, p. 506), the point is the following: 
“talent goes into activities with the highest private returns, which need not have the 
highest social returns”.  
 
These authors assume increasing returns on talent. In other words, the greater the ability 
of an individual, the greater his private benefits will be. Because the exercise of talent is 
physically limited (by the period of human activity in a day), talented individuals tend 
to invest themselves and their abilities into reward maximising occupations. It follows 
that their occupational choice will be determined by the size of the market, the 
compensation contract (rewards on talent application) and the technology. 
 
Furthermore, the allocation of talent can be linked both with institutional context, as 
well as non-pecuniary explicative factors.  
 
The legal framework and its effective use define a propitious environment for 
entrepreneurship and, contrarily, for rent-seeking behaviour. Property rights, the 
conditions of their application, and the respect of these rights, appear to be crucial 
factors. They contribute particularly and decisively to precise the compensation 
circumstances that have already been quoted, as well as the fiscal organisation. 
Information is also important as it determines the efficiency of allocation and the 
                                                 
11 About this question, cf. Buchanan (1980). 
12 Cf. Acemoglu (1995), Baland and Francois (2000), Baumol (1990, 1993), Murphy, Shleifer et 
Vishny (1991, 1993).   10
possibility of linking the application of talent and its results. (Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1991; Baumol, 1990, 1993; Acemoglu, 1995) 
 
Social esteem might play a role. The question becomes therefore how much 
entrepreneurship is socially valuable and valorised, over another less socially 
productive occupation13. Finally, entrepreneurs or rent-seekers might influence, by 
voting or lobbying, political organisation and political decisions. The idea is that the 
political equilibrium, replying to one or another group’s interests, will make decisions 
that favour its maintenance14. (Baumol, 1990, 1993; Acemoglu, 1995) 
 
Entrepreneurship and rent-seeking in motion 
 
The interaction between entrepreneurship and rent-seeking is without doubt an 
interesting question to examine. Formalised models show that multiple equilibria – an 
equilibrium being defined by an entrepreneur share in the population and a rate of 
growth – may exist. We will not insist on model developments. The interested reader 
may consult the references we provide. However, briefly, we note that the results are 
grounded on the specification of two functions, both with negative slopes, and 
consequently a potential for multiple intersections. Because it places burdens on 
entrepreneurial rewards, rent-seeking negatively affects entrepreneurship. Moreover, 
given competition in the rent-seeking sector itself15, rent-seeking rewards will depend 
negatively on the number of rent-seekers (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; 
Acemoglu, 1995). Baland and Francois (2000) formalise as well the effect of 
entrepreneurial activities on rent-seeking. Their model can apply to an economy with 
import license. The production of direct substitutes by local entrepreneurs tends to turn 
off the rents obtained by importers. Here also, results suggest the existence of multiple 
equilibria16. 
 
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993, pp. 412-413) deal with rent-seeking affecting the 
innovation sector. According to these authors, rent-seeking, whether from private or 
public origins, can undoubtedly burden the profits of established productive sectors. 
                                                 
13 Socially productive occupations are defined in this paper, let us stress it again, by their contribution to 
economic growth or, in other words, to increases in GDP. 
14 With regard to this last argument, we can point out that the innovative entrepreneur should be strongly 
inclined, when in a (temporary) monopoly position, to adopt rent-seeking behaviour. 
15 Acemoglu (1995, p. 29) mentions, but does not formalise, the case when barriers to entry in rent-seeking 
activities are established by insiders. 
16 The authors discuss moreover the effect of an exogenous resource boom such as an increase in income 
resulting from an increase in the world price of exports. The result, more entrepreneurship or more rent-
seeking, depends in their model on the importance of the proportion of entrepreneurs and rent-seekers in 
the population preceding the shock. 
Tornell and Lane (1999) analyse the consequences of windfalls in a two sectors economy. The first sector 
can be taxed, the second cannot. Moreover, the first sector is using a more efficient technology than the 
second one. The economy is characterised by weak legal and political institutions and by the existence of 
some powerful lobbies. Each of them tries then to support their own interest in an effort to increase their 
share of the national wealth through additional transfers. This leads to higher tax rates, where they can be 
applied, that is in the first sector. This provokes the reallocation of production factors towards the non-
taxed and less productive sector. The result, called the voracity effect, is that a positive exogenous shock 
can be followed by a more than proportional increase of transfers and a decline in growth.   11
The innovation sector, however, might be described the reserved hunting ground, for 
the most part, of public rent-seeking. Their arguments rely particularly on the nature of 
innovation. In his project developments, the innovative entrepreneur is confronted with 
legal and environmental constraints. Innovation can imply indeed production permits, 
licenses, dispensations, as well as amending the local zoning regulations. This results in 
demand for government intervention and it provides opportunities for corruption. 
Moreover, the socially unproductive transfers that corruption implies, might have some 
inhibitive effects on innovation activity, given that innovators may not have equal 
lobbying power compared to that of established firms, or the same financial resources to 
pay bribes. Important funds may then be consumed instead of being invested, to avoid 
expropriation. The ex post existence of rent-seeking should raise the project risk and 
effective cost. The authors mention, following these arguments, that the negative effects 
of rent-seeking could be limited if the rent-seeker himself becomes a stakeholder in the 
innovation project. In the long run, he would find his interest in such an involvement. 
We note moreover that this idea can be generalised as: rent-seeking, by burdening 
current entrepreneurial profits, limits its future transfer opportunities. 
 
Thus, the interaction between entrepreneurship and rent-seeking can generate multiple 
equilibria that correspond to an allocation of talents and an economic growth rate. 
Starting from a dynamic extension of his basic model, Acemoglu (1995) discusses the 
history dependence of an economy. Past and current allocations of talents influence the 
future structure of rewards. Given historical circumstances (particularly describing 
successive states of determining factors and allocation), the economy can be locked in 
low or high steady state equilibrium17. Under these circumstances, only a shock will 





A positive interaction between growth and entrepreneurship is grounded on the 
innovation activity that entrepreneurs convey. Thus, a significant entrepreneurial 
supply in the economy stirs up scholarly interest.  
 
The first argument in this paper suggested that the supply of entrepreneurial activity is 
not independent of growth. In this way, the discussion has supported the idea that the 
integration into analysis of factors determining the individual occupational choice was 
very important. Under the circumstances, relative rewards have been recognised as the 
variables through which arises the endogeneity of entrepreneurship and growth. 
 
A second argument concerned the allocation of entrepreneurial supply between socially 
productive and unproductive projects. This allocation relies also on an arbitrage. It also 
determines economic growth. 
 
                                                 
17 Extrema would be high rent-seeking and low growth rate, or high active and socially productive 
entrepreneurship and high growth rate.   12
The last question is the one that will probably keep the attention of the policy maker. In 
contrast to the entrepreneurial supply, which is ultimately explained by the distribution 
of skills and abilities in the population and on which it is difficult to intervene, the 
allocation presents some opportunities for public actions (Baumol, 1990, 1993). It could 
for example take the form of (additional) fiscal measures in favour of innovation 
rewards. Another way could consist in (heavier) penalties on socially unproductive 
activities. Referring more particularly to economies that are developing or in transition, 
Dutz, Ordover and Willig (2000) stress the primordial role that could be played by 
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